Verified Transparency : new conceptual ideas for conventional armscontrol in Europe by Schmidt, Hans-Joachim
Verified Transparency
New conceptual ideas for conventional arms  
control in Europe
Hans-Joachim Schmidt
PRIF Report No. 119 
the
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 © Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) 2013 
 
 
 
Correspondence to: 
PRIF (HSFK)  Baseler Straße 27-31  60329 Frankfurt am Main  Germany 
Telephone: +49(0)69 95 91 04-0  Fax: +49(0)69 55 84 81 
E-mail: schmidth@hsfk.de  Internet: www.prif.org 
 
 
 
ISBN: 978-3-942532-51-8 
 
 
Euro 10,– 
 
  
Summary 
The future of conventional arms control in Europe is currently at a crossroads. It will 
either be possible to modernize the layered und mutually complementary regimes that 
include the outdated and legally binding CFE Treaty along with the politically binding 
Vienna Document 2011 or they will simply fade away. The next four years under Obama 
will perhaps prove to be the last chance for the revival of conventional arms control and 
the strengthening of cooperative security within the OSCE. 
The main political problem for European security is now the growing mistrust of Rus-
sia among Western countries and the growing mistrust of Western countries among a 
more authoritarian Russian leadership. With the end of the Cold War, conventional arms 
control has contributed to the greatly reduced threat of interstate war in Europe through 
the reduction of conventional forces. Then again, military unaccountability and unpre-
dictability seem to be increasing for Russia with the enlargement of NATO and the 
planned development of conventional missile defense in Europe. The adapted CFE Trea-
ty, signed at the end of the 1990s, should be able to constrain the growing unaccountabil-
ity and potential instability caused by alliance enlargement through its innovative and 
more rigid limitation system; but it has not yet entered into force. During the last decade, 
progress on conventional arms control was blocked by conservative arms control adver-
saries in the Bush administration and other countries that linked progress along these 
lines almost exclusively with the regulation of the unresolved territorial conflicts in the 
Caucasus. Obama tried to remove this blockade by resetting U.S.-Russia relations in arms 
control. The new START Treaty has been an initial success but in spite of some prelimi-
nary efforts, the reset has not had an impact on conventional arms control so far.  
The decision by NATO in Lisbon 2010 to establish a conventional missile defense ca-
pability against a possible future threat of nuclear-tipped missiles from Iran, in combina-
tion with U.S. defense plans for prompt conventional global strike capability and, more 
importantly, a conventional long-rage strike capability by bombers and ships, have all 
raised Russian concerns about the future stability of its nuclear deterrence forces. Russia 
suspended the implementation of the outdated CFE Treaty at the end of 2007 as a warn-
ing signal to NATO and stopped its talks after few months about the modernization of 
conventional arms control three years later in May 2011. A conservative U.S. Congress 
blocked the political maneuverability of U.S. President Obama with regard to missile de-
fense before his second election, so progress on this issue could be not expected. Since 
then, it seems Russia has taken conventional arms control as a hostage for further pro-
gress on cooperation in missile defense.  
With the re-election of Obama, the reset of U.S.-Russia relations in missile defense and 
conventional arms control is still pending. Progress on the controversial issue of missile 
defense seems to be a precondition to revive the political reset and initiate new talks on 
the modernization of conventional arms control. However, the previous attempt in au-
tumn 2007 to marginally update the adapted CFE Treaty and ratify it then will no longer 
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work. Too much will have changed in security policy and military technological develop-
ments in the next years. A new approach is necessary; one that focuses on the growing 
mistrust of Russia. It should cover all new conventional military developments which may 
threaten future stability in Europe, increase the military accountability of NATO en-
largement, and strengthen war prevention in the cases of the unregulated territorial con-
flicts. It should further contribute to Obama’s new goal of Global Zero by facilitating the 
reduction and withdrawal of sub-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe.  
Germany has used this period of standstill in conventional arms control to develop 
new conceptual ideas in regards to ‘verified transparency’ for future conventional arms 
control in Europe and has started its own discussions. These discussions are on-going and 
have been deepened. It now seems the right time to participate in this discussion from a 
research perspective and discuss the pros and cons of these conceptual ideas, at least as far 
as they are currently known. The author was involved in an experts hearing and has been 
following the discussion closely. The report is based on these observations and presents 
only his personal views.  
Transparency is an integral tool for reducing mistrust and increasing confidence and 
accountability; verification of transparency strongly supports this goal. A comprehensive 
approach towards openness can widen this desired effect. It can likewise cover a wide 
range of military developments that may go on to tackle future military stability. There-
fore, it seems well suited to overcome Russia’s growing mistrust towards NATO. Verified 
transparency builds less on limitations than other options might, while comprehensive 
transparency reduces the demands for limitations. However, these ideas do not exclude 
limitations per se. They may still be necessary to prevent war and increase crisis stability 
in the cases of unregulated territorial conflicts, to support regional stabilization and to 
prevent future destabilizing military developments.  
The new ideas are built upon a certain level of confidence, as neither NATO nor Rus-
sia has the intention to revive Cold War military confrontations. The high budget deficit 
in the USA, the severe financial crisis in the EU and the growing necessity of economic 
reforms in Russia strongly support cooperative management of military security in Eu-
rope and should therefore receive greatly increased attention from leading politicians of 
all involved parties.  
The new ideas of verified transparency could be used with great flexibility and are 
based on many known elements of conventional arms control. They consist of three ma-
jor complementary and mutually reinforcing elements: the verified transparency of mili-
tary potentials, of military intentions, and of military capabilities. This should be supple-
mented by additional confidence and security building measures. Transparency of 
military potentials should be widened and include data on special and rapid response 
forces, force multipliers, and military transportation systems. The conventional sea forces 
of European states including U.S. and Canadian navies along with missions for European 
security should also be covered. They should, however, be excluded from any constraints 
of other forces. It is of utmost importance to heighten transparency of Western sea forces 
and their military capabilities in order for Russia to calm growing security concern and 
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facilitate a reduction of Russian sub-strategic nuclear weapons, which are mainly concen-
trated in Russian naval forces.  
Transparency of military capabilities serves as a new ambitious approach to conven-
tional arms control and would complement transparency of military potentials. It is de-
pendent on sufficient countable and verifiable military elements of the selected capabili-
ties and would go beyond a simple bean counting approach. All participants would have 
access to a realistic view of what military forces can do and what they cannot do. This new 
approach also offers the opportunity to discuss possible destabilizing military develop-
ments and options for their regulation if necessary. This approach is open to the realm of 
missile defense, but other cooperative solutions should be possible as well. 
Transparency of military intentions is important in that it informs others about the 
goals of military forces and can be compared with one’s own military potentials and capa-
bilities to enhance accountability and confidence. A layered system of openness and veri-
fication would be sufficient for this purpose. This would be based on information con-
cerning military doctrines, defense guidelines, defense plans and defense budgets. It 
would include verification via regular multinational observation of one or two major mili-
tary activities every two or three years for each participant. Defensive intentions can com-
pensate for military asymmetries of conventional potentials and capabilities as long as 
military stability is not touched. 
Additional confidence and security building measures should increase the accountability 
of NATO enlargement, strengthen the security of East Central European states and enhance 
war prevention and crisis stability for states with unregulated territorial conflicts. They 
would also present a functional equivalent for the controversial flank limitations. Under a 
new deployment rule, all states would notify others of new small deployments of combat 
forces in advance. Any deployment of land and air forces that reaches a critical threshold for 
significant deployments of combat troops would require additional strong justification and 
should be observed regularly. The same mechanism is proposed for a concentration rule 
which would force all states to notify others in advance of the concentration of land forces 
in a defined border area if they reach a critical threshold. Such activity should be observed 
by multinational observers as well. If activities such as these persist for a longer time, their 
notification and observation should be repeated every three months. Mutual politically 
binding ‘no-increase’ commitments for military forces in certain regions and areas can fur-
ther strengthen this rule. 
Verification is an indispensable tool of this approach. It could be strengthened by the 
introduction of a new multinational verification agency, similar to the OPCW or IAEA. 
This agency could overcome the existing structural deficits of CFE verification and save 
costs for many of the members. However, capability inspections should continue to be 
organized by national verification agencies due to the fact that the inspectors would need 
advanced special education, something that an international agency could not provide in 
a cost effective manner. Passive inspections of capabilities should be limited to two or 
three every three to five years for each member, owing to the time consuming prepara-
tions involved. Verification of naval forces should be conducted in European home ports 
and designated European ports for Canadian and U.S. forces. 
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Institutions such as NATO, the EU, and CSTO cannot provide European security on 
their own. They need mutual security cooperation under the roof of the OSCE to achieve 
this purpose. Several existing unregulated territorial conflicts in Europe can only be re-
solved with and not in spite of Russia. Therefore, not blockades – as utilized in the last 
decade – but the modernization of conventional arms control will help create the political 
environment conducive to this important task. The political solution of unregulated terri-
torial conflicts should therefore be separated from conventional arms control.  
Because support for conventional arms control seems weak in Russia and in the USA, 
West European countries should take on responsibility for the maintenance and moderni-
zation of this instrument and double their efforts. German development of new conceptual 
ideas and their discussion within the alliance are significant first steps in this direction.  
The next meeting between U.S. President Obama and Russian President Putin this year 
will show to what extent a revival of the reset in arms control relations between both parties 
and NATO will be possible. After Obama’s re-election, Russia has no longer demanded 
legally binding constraints of Western missile defense in Europe. This should facilitate more 
flexibility on the U.S. side for a possible compromise on this issue. Russia, in turn, should 
reenter modernization talks of conventional arms control as a constructive player. 
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1.  Introduction 
Conventional arms control in Europe consists of three complementary regimes: the Treaty 
on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), the Open Skies Treaty, and the Vienna 
Document on Confidence and Security Building Measures. The CFE Treaty limits the arse-
nals of land and air forces in five weapon categories (tanks, armored combat vehicles, artil-
lery, attack helicopters, and combat aircraft) and the CFE 1A agreement limits military per-
sonnel.1 The aim of this treaty was to prevent any surprise or comprehensive attacks 
between NATO and the former Warsaw Pact members. The Open Skies Treaty covers the 
territory of 34 participating states between Vladivostok and Vancouver in regards to obser-
vation flights.2 It can also be used to verify all arms control regimes of the participants. The 
Vienna Document limits military activities and contains additional transparency and confi-
dence-building measures to enhance the security of all 57 OSCE member states.3 
This system of conventional arms control now finds itself in deep crisis and may soon 
come to an end. In part, this crisis is a consequence of the success of conventional arms 
control and the arms reductions of the CFE Treaty in the first half of the 1990s. It forced 
NATO and the former Warsaw Pact member countries to reduce over 70,000 weapons 
(Crawford 2010: 30, 32). These reductions and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, 
followed by the break-up of the Soviet Union in the same year, have ended the large military 
confrontations in Europe. In light of this, is conventional arms control still necessary? 
However, the enlargement of NATO into Eastern Europe challenged the block-to-
block structure of the CFE Treaty and raised fears in Moscow that the Western alliance 
could move its superior conventional forces nearer to its border, if these trends were not 
halted. The adapted CFE Treaty (aCFE), signed in 1999, was meant to overcome this out-
dated block-to-block structure and reduce such Russian fears through its new concept of 
more rigid national and territorial limitations.4 But Western countries ended up blocking 
 
 
1  For further details, see Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, in: www.osce.org/library/14087 
(28.2.2013). The treaty finally entered into force on November 9, 1992 and has the following 30 members: 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Georgia, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Moldova, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, the 
United Kingdom, and the USA. The treaty is supplemented by the politically binding Concluding Act of 
the Negotiations on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE 1A Agreement), 
in: www.osce.org/library/14093 (28.2.2013). A short Annex I contains the main elements of the Treaty. 
2  For further details, see Treaty on Open Skies, in: www.osce.org/library/14127 (28.2.2013). The Treaty 
entered into force on January 1, 2002 and has the following members: Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Swe-
den, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  
3  For further details, see Vienna Document on Confidence and Security Building Measures 2011, in: 
www.osce.org/fsc/86597 (28.2.2013). Since 1990, this politically binding document has been updated sev-
eral times in 1992, 1994, 1999 and 2011. A short Annex II contains the main elements of the Document. 
4  National limits constrained the major conventional weapon categories of the land and air forces of a State 
Party in the entire application area. Territorial limits constrained national and foreign deployed land 
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the treaty’s ratification. The Bush administration, which was averse to arms control, and 
many other governments linked its intentions to finding a political solution to a number 
of unregulated territorial conflicts5 in the South Caucasus. This politically decoupled the 
ongoing process of alliance enlargement from stabilizing arms control measures com-
pletely, thereby raising suspicion and mistrust in Russia.  
Russian suspicion and mistrust have further been aggravated by the growing debate on 
missile defense in the Western alliance. Russia feared that NATO would widen its military 
capabilities in a second sensitive security area without any constraints or accountability. 
Furthermore, an unlimited Western missile defense system in Europe had the potential to 
one day jeopardize Russian’s second strike capability (Arbatov 2011: 17). Additionally, the 
enlargement of NATO towards Georgia and the Ukraine was looming on the horizon. In 
response, Putin suspended the CFE Treaty at the end of 2007 as a warning signal for oth-
ers to take Russian security concerns more seriously. NATO’s decision in 2008 to offer 
Georgia and the Ukraine alliance membership at a yet undetermined time raised tensions 
between Russia and Georgia. These tensions led to an attack by Georgia on its entity, 
South Ossetia, in August 2008 and the subsequent Russian intervention. Later, Moscow 
recognized the Georgian entities Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. This 
complicates conventional arms control further since both Western states and Georgia 
desire to return to the territorial status quo ante before the war.  
In 2009, newly elected U.S. President Obama started the reset of U.S. relations towards 
Russia with the aim of repairing the strained relationship under the Bush administration. In 
this context, the revival of strategic nuclear arms control had priority for both. In 2010, the 
Corfu Process6, the OSCE summit in Astana and the NATO proposal to establish a ‘Strate-
gic Partnership’ between the Alliance and Russia led the way for a start of new conventional 
arms control talks. But progress has become more difficult with time. The Revolution in 
Military Affairs (RMA), which enhanced the range, accuracy and efficiency of U.S. conven-
tional weapon systems, has further increased already existing security concerns (Miasnikov 
2012; Gormley 2009; Arbatov/Dvorkin/Oznobishchev 2012) in Russia. American military 
programs like the conventional long range strike (CLRS) capabilities and the controversial 
conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) capabilities have enhanced such Russian fears 
(Acton 2011: 59). Therefore, Russia not only wants more accountability from NATO en-
largement but also increased accountability on the issue of the extent to which these new 
 
 
forces in the territory of a certain State Party. See article 21 and 22 of aCFE. For further details, see 
Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Convention al Armed Forces in Euope 1999, in: www.osce. 
org/library/14108 (28.2.2013).  
5  With the fall of the Soviet Union, several entities had violently tried to gain independence from the new 
Soviet successor states: South Ossetia and Abkhazia from Georgia, Transdniestre from Moldova and Na-
gorno-Karabakh supported by Armenia from Azerbaijan. Russia negotiated armistice agreements and de-
ployed peace units and regular troops in Georgia and Moldova. Russian support for the entities gives its 
peace mission there an ambivalent character.  
6 The Corfu Process was initiated in June 2009 by the OSCE foreign ministers. Its goal is to restore confidence 
and promote talks about wider European security. See the Corfu Process, in: www.osce.org/ cio/46125 
(28.2.2013). 
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conventional technological developments and future military capabilities will threaten es-
sential security functions of its (nuclear) forces (Arbatov 2011: 23-24).  
Because the U.S. government was unable – for domestic reasons – to accept limitations 
of U.S. conventional ballistic missile defense capabilities in Europe or offer a legal guaran-
tee that these means will not be used against Russian nuclear forces, Moscow was unwill-
ing to go ahead with conventional arms control talks on a new framework agreement.7 
They were suspended in May 20118 and, in response, the CFE Treaty members belonging 
to NATO suspended their annual information exchange with Russia in 2011, along with 
Georgia and Moldova.  
These developments have again changed the framework for conventional arms control. 
A minor update of aCFE and its prompt ratification will no longer be possible and must be 
replaced by a new approach (Gottemoeller 2012). What is more, the new stalemate has pro-
vided time for discussing alternatives for conventional arms control, owing to the fact that 
U.S. President Obama was unable to break the Russian blockade before his re-election at the 
end of 2012.9 In Germany, the stalemate has been used for the development of new concep-
tual ideas. A procedural idea is to launch this discussion in three consecutive steps: First, it 
should start with talks about future principles and objectives for conventional arms control. 
Second, once a common understanding has been reached, the paths towards a new regime 
should be outlined. Finally, negotiations on the necessary instruments should follow. 
This report is built upon this procedural line as well: after a chapter that discusses the 
reasons for the current crisis, possible future principles and objectives, the ways and in-
struments for conventional arms control are addressed. In regards to the instruments, the 
author presents new conceptual ideas pertaining to ‘verified transparency’. The principle 
purpose of this report is to introduce these new ideas to both the public and a broader 
international community of (academic) experts and, based on these ideas, present a flexi-
ble concept that has been developed by the author and, in turn, learn from the concept’s 
pros and cons that will arise from subsequent discussions. The author wishes to empha-
size that these are only his personal views on the matter.10  
 
 
7  The official name was “Framework for negotiations to strengthen and to modernize the conventional 
arms control regime in Europe”. All NATO states participated in the informal “to 36 format” talks. 
8  See statement by Grigory Berdennikov, Russian envoy at the IAEA: “Our position is that in order to move 
forward [in nuclear and conventional arms cuts] we should implement the existing agreements [especially 
in the framework of the New START treaty], […]. But how are we supposed to move forward if the Unit-
ed States refuses to curb its missile defenses?” cited : N.N., U.S. missile defense hinder new arms cuts – 
Russia, in: RIA Novosti, 30.6.2012, in: http://en.rian.ru/russia/20120630/174322372.html (28.2.2013). 
9  See Goodman, David, Microphone Catches a Candid Obama, in: New York Times 26 March 2012, in: 
www.nytimes.com/2012/03/27/us/politics/obama-caught-on-microphone-telling-medvedev-of-flexibility. 
html (26.3.2012). 
10  The author does not describe any official position or proposal of the German government and he alone 
bears responsibility for the entire contents of this report. He cordially thanks Giorgio Franceschini,  
Annette Schaper, Niklas Schörnig, Caroline Fehl and Rüdiger Hartmann for their helpful comments on 
earlier drafts and Nick Gemmell for his language editing. 
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As growing mistrust between Russia and NATO is the main concern for European se-
curity, it is the primary goal of the ideas presented here to restore confidence through 
substantially enhanced transparency of military arsenals, capabilities and intentions and 
their necessary verification. Only heightened transparency that covers all major new 
technological developments of conventional military arsenals and capabilities can per-
form such a task. The new ideas are less oriented towards limitations (Nikel 2012: 11-12) 
and are thus based on the condition of a certain amount of confidence growing among 
the participating states. However, they do not exclude limitations per se, rather reduce 
their necessity. Verification of military arsenals, capabilities and intentions is an indispen-
sable tool for creating sufficient trust and accountability. Most of the discussed measures 
are not entirely new and some may already be widely known. They can, however, be im-
plemented in a different manner for new conventional arms control architecture. Fur-
thermore, conceptual ideas can be structured and used in a very flexible manner for a 
variety of purposes. They offer a versatile toolkit for disseminating information about, 
analyzing, examining and evaluating military forces. Therefore, comprehensive verified 
transparency seems much better suited to enhancing confidence and answering the ques-
tion of the extent to which military stability can be threatened by certain new military 
developments and capabilities. The conclusions aim to evaluate the possible political 
problems related to implementing these new ideas. Finally, two annexes have been added 
to provide an overview of the CFE Treaty and of the Vienna Document. 
2. The Crisis of Conventional Arms Control in Europe 
Various developments on the political, security, and military-technical levels have con-
verged and weakened the perspective of conventional arms control in Europe. As men-
tioned above, one of the major political issues is the mounting mistrust on the Russian 
side owing to NATO enlargement and the fact that conventional missile defense in Eu-
rope has not yet been constrained. This raises the question as to whether the U.S. and 
NATO are at all interested in maintaining military accountability in Europe any longer 
being that Russia appears too weak militarily and can therefore be downplayed. 
On the other hand, many Western countries are disappointed by the growing authori-
tarian rule in Russia and the mounting differences in regards to the ways that Moscow has 
managed the nuclear crisis with Iran as well as the civil war in Syria. Furthermore, Western 
countries complain of a lack to willingness on the part of Russia in regards to engagement in 
finding a solution to the unregulated territorial conflicts in Georgia, Moldova and between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan. But here, Western critics, in particular in the U.S. Congress, 
should bear in mind that internal Western territorial conflicts such as Gibraltar, between 
Spain and United Kingdom,11 and Cyprus, between Turkey and Greece, are even older and 
have been not resolved either.  
 
 
11  Every CFE data exchange from the United Kingdom which contains military data on Gibraltar is an-
swered by a diplomatic note from Spain refusing the territorial claim by London.  
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The U.S. government has still not formulated any new goals while its new approach 
towards conventional arms control in Europe and the interagency process for a consensus 
on arms control have not yet been started. Within the Russian government, division over 
conventional arms control is growing between the foreign and defense ministries. The 
defense ministry currently determines arms control policies for Russia. This ministry has 
a much lower interest in arms control and subordinates the matter completely under its 
conventional force modernization plans. The foreign ministry seems to have a stronger 
interest in conventional arms control but has lost the prerogative. Therefore, Russia cur-
rently finds itself in a ‘wait and see’ mode.  
The crisis of conventional arms control has several additional origins. Because the large 
conventional military threat has disappeared in Europe, high-ranking politicians in North 
America and Western Europe no longer have a major interest in conventional arms control 
or its modernization. It seems very difficult to win their attention on this issue.  
As a further consequence of the diminished threat, Europe faces growing political di-
versity of security views, creating more difficulties for defining common goals for future 
conventional arms control. West European countries such as Spain, France, Great Britain, 
Italy and Germany generally do not fear Russia or its forces; however, small Central-
Eastern European countries like the Baltic States have a different view, for understandable 
historical reasons. They look upon Moscow’s planned conventional military moderniza-
tion up to 2020 as well as new weapon and force deployments in the Russian Federation 
with a different perception. Outside of the alliance, states like Georgia, Moldova and 
Azerbaijan have tried to subordinate progress on conventional arms control to their polit-
ical goal of finding a solution for their unregulated territorial conflicts first.  
What is more, the nature of the threat has changed. During the Cold War, the risk of 
interstate conflict was high in Europe. With the end of this era, the risks in other fields, 
namely domestic violence, civil wars and terroristic acts, have increased across Europe. 
But traditional arms control, which takes place on the interstate level, is less suited for the 
management of such risks.  
The crisis is further aggravated by the modern technological revolution. Conventional 
troops and weapons can be moved faster than in the past and the conventionalization of 
previous strategic nuclear delivery systems like intercontinental ballistic missiles, the 
coming introduction of conventional hypersonic glide vehicles within the conventional 
prompt global strike program of the U.S., and growing numbers of heavy bombers within 
the conventional long-range strike program give conventional weapons a global and stra-
tegic range. With this important distinctions between conventional and nuclear strategic 
weapons have begun to be blurred. The ongoing development of unmanned weapon sys-
tems like armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), combat aircraft and armored combat 
vehicles, which can even be steered from other continents, is changing modern conven-
tional warfare as well. The interrelationship between all these conventional moderniza-
tion efforts and the ongoing development of cyber weapons for modern warfare is not 
fully understood and this further increases unaccountability, insecurity and concerns 
about military stability (Anthony 2012: 416).  
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In spite of all these negative developments there is still room for conventional arms con-
trol. The political enlargement of the Western alliance has not changed the military de-
ployments in Europe in such a significant way. The rotational deployment of some small 
U.S. army and air force units in Poland, Bulgaria and Romania since 2005, the establish-
ment of NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission since 2004, and the higher presence of NATO 
vessels in the Black Sea and the eastern part of the Baltic See cannot be seen as major change 
of its strategic orientation towards Russia. On the contrary, U.S. Forces in Europe will fur-
ther reduce their footprint by the withdrawal of two brigades by the end of 2014 on account 
of severe budget deficit in the United States and their reorientation towards Asia.12  
3. Why we still need Conventional Arms Control in Europe 
This question is more difficult to answer now than during the Cold War as the grave mili-
tary threat has disappeared. Neither NATO nor Russia currently has the intention of at-
tacking the other or preparing the development of military capabilities in the future. Un-
der the present financial crisis in the United States and Europe, it would be imprudent to 
adopt such a policy goal. On the contrary, the present financial crisis should be seen as 
strong motive to go ahead with conventional arms control in order to promote and 
strengthen common security in Europe at the lowest possible costs and thereby use con-
ventional arms control as a means to overcome the present financial difficulties. An 
agreement of mutual military restraint in Europe could also facilitate cooperation in other 
areas between the participants. Additional reasons for maintaining and modernizing con-
ventional arms control also exist. 
Permanent military transparency and on-site verification of military forces preserve 
and create accountability and trust between states. On the contrary, ending military 
transparency and verification could increase mistrust and unaccountability and thereby 
enhance security concerns in Europe once again. Mutual suspicions would return and 
undermine efforts towards security and stability in Europe.  
A major threat lies in the mere existence of military forces and their development. The 
central question is whether or not they will be used solely for defensive purposes or if they 
will also be utilized for offensive goals. This is a question of military intentions and what a 
state intends to do with its forces. As long as the intentions are purely defensive, they 
should not pose any security issues for others, even if a state possesses large forces. But of-
fensive intentions are also a possibility. It is therefore imperative to have sufficient infor-
mation about intentions and have the ability to assess them in a credible and reliable way.  
Here, the interrelationship between military intentions and military capabilities comes 
into play. The capabilities of military forces can also be either more defensive or offensive. 
 
 
12  Vandiver, John/Sven, Jennifer, Panetta: 2 army combat brigades will leave Europe, in: Stars and Stripes, 12 
January 2012, in: www.stripes.com/news/panetta-2-army-combat-brigades-will-leave-europe-1.165867 
(28.2.2013). 
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If defensive intentions are congruent with the military capabilities of forces, this set-up 
should prove least threatening. If offensive intentions correspond with offensive military 
capabilities, this poses a high potential threat to others. Also, a certain mix of offensive 
and defensive military capabilities can raise security concerns and threaten stability, if 
defensive capabilities of one side largely outbalance the offensive capabilities of the adver-
sary, especially if the offensive capabilities of the first can allow a preemptive strike. Even 
the assumption that one state will follow this path can raise security concerns and mis-
trust. Examples of such a perception are Russia and China, who look with growing mis-
trust to conventional missile defense capabilities of the United States and also to new con-
ventional offensive capabilities such as ‘conventional prompt global strike’ and ‘conven-
tional long range strike’. Here, a mere regional arms control approach to stabilize these 
new capabilities will not work. But in the case of conventional missile defense in Europe, a 
regional approach might be possible as long as the system defends only European territo-
ry against short and medium range missiles.  
In reality, a purely defensive or offensive orientation is rare; often there is a mix of de-
fensive and offensive intentions and military capabilities which create ambivalence of 
threat perceptions and assessments. These ‘mixed signal’ can still generate insecurity, 
mistrust and contribute to the security dilemma. The acceptance and implementation of 
arms control can reduce the ambivalence of threat perceptions, promote confidence and 
thereby further strengthen war prevention and crisis stability.  
Notwithstanding the fact that the Cold War military threat has disappeared, Europe 
still faces several smaller threats and risks to security. The perception of these threats is 
decisive and it does not really matter how rational it is. In spite of the fact that the Cold 
War was overcome more than twenty years ago, individuals and groups with the tradi-
tional perception that NATO and Russia are a military threat to each other still abound. 
Even in the newest Russian military doctrine, NATO is mentioned as the ‘main threat’ 
(RusMilDoc 2010: No. 8a) and the former conservative U.S. presidential candidate, Mitt 
Romney, described Russia as the ‘number one geopolitical foe’.13 Such perceptions cannot 
be overcome overnight; conventional arms control can help to surmount such views.  
Another threat lies in a number of unresolved territorial conflicts. As the local war in 
Georgia showed in 200814, the unresolved territorial conflicts in Europe can cause internal 
violence with the risk of escalating into interstate war, thereby jeopardizing European 
security as long as political solutions to such conflicts are not possible. This risk still exists 
in Georgia, between the central state and its entities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in 
 
 
13  See Willis, Amy: Mitt Romney: Russia is America's 'number one geopolitical foe', in: The Telegraph, 27 
March 2012, in: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/us-election/9168533/Mitt-Romney-Russia-is-
Americas-number-one-geopolitical-foe.html# (15.6.2012). 
14  The CFE Treaty regime was not well suited to preventing this war for several reasons: First, the war start-
ed as an internal violent conflict, whereas CFE is only meant to prevent interstate wars. Secondly, Russia 
had suspended its CFE implementation in December 2007, so it could no longer be used to inspect Rus-
sian forces in advance. Thirdly, the leader of a CFE inspection in Georgia in June 2008 missed the oppor-
tunity to give a stronger political signal against a possible war (Schmidt 2009: 22). 
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Moldova, between the central government and the entity of Transdniestre, and in Ser-
bia,15 between the central government and the entity of Kosovo. A similar, though not 
identical situation, exists between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus and an even stronger 
threat of war exists between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the entity Nagorno-Karabakh. 
The risk of war seems high in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh and very low in the case of 
Transdniestre and Cyprus, while the threats in the other conflicts are classified as medi-
um. In all these examples, the outlook for an early political solution seems rather dim. 
Therefore, the tasks of war prevention, crisis stability and of preventive diplomacy — also 
by means of conventional arms control – are still very important, not only on the local 
and regional levels, but also on the European security level, since these conflicts can esca-
late into full-fledged interstate wars.  
Due to historical and political considerations, some small Eastern European countries 
have more reason to mistrust and fear Russia, thereby demanding greater military en-
gagement from Western NATO countries and the U.S. for their territorial defense. On the 
other hand, Russia fears the further enlargement of the Alliance and a stronger military 
engagement of Western NATO countries and the U.S. near its borders. These can be the 
preconditions for a vicious self-fulfilling circle if it is not interrupted. Here, again, con-
ventional arms control and military confidence building can contribute to minimizing 
such fears and risks and enhancing accountability, security and confidence on all sides.  
After the end of the Cold War, military cooperation has slowly grown between NATO 
and Russia. More military cooperation can also increase confidence and accountability, 
thereby reducing the demands for arms control. But the process of military cooperation 
between NATO and Russia is still in its early stages and cannot currently provide the 
same security performance as a conventional arms control regime. Therefore, we need 
both military cooperation and arms control in tandem in order to enhance and stabilize 
security in Europe (Richter 2011: 3).  
Finally, the swelling interest in long term goals of reducing nuclear weapons to zero 
increases the importance of conventional military forces, conventional deterrence, and 
the asymmetries in this field for European security and the stability of nuclear deterrence. 
Russia compensates for its perceived conventional military inferiority in Europe with a 
much higher number of sub-strategic nuclear weapons in its European areas (Arbartov/ 
Kaliadine 2012: 40). Without the preservation and modernization of conventional arms 
control, it seems impossible to imagine how all these asymmetries and potential instabili-
ties can be managed in a stable and accountable way that reassure and support a stable 
and secure process of regional and global nuclear disarmament (Acton 2011: 76, 77). The 
preservation and modernization of conventional arms control is also an argument for 
promoting the latter in other regions of the world with greater credibility.  
 
 
15  Serbia, and not Kosovo, is a state party of the Sub-regional Arms Control Agreement of 1996, which may 
be integrated into a future conventional arms control regime in Europe. 
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4.  Principles and Objectives for Conventional Arms Control  
Modernization 
The principles of the Helsinki Decalogue (1975) form the basis of cooperative security 
and arms control in Europe.16 Sovereign equality, refraining from the threat or use of 
force, inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity of states, and the peaceful settlement of 
disputes are still important principles. They are supplemented by other principles such as 
the indivisibility of security, the freedom of states to choose their own security arrange-
ments (Charter of Paris 1990), and the principle of reciprocity. 
In principle, all OSCE participating states in Europe should have the right to enter into 
and to participate in a future European arms control regime. In particular, this should cover 
all states which are members of security institutions in Europe (NATO, CSTO17 and EU).  
However, the above-mentioned variance in the security situation in Europe raises the 
question of whether it is still possible to gain the same level of security for all participants 
by using the same means of arms control in the whole of Europe. Or, does it seem more 
appropriate to maintain a similar or equal level of security by adapting the means of arms 
control to changes in security? In the latter case, the principle of indivisible security 
should be reinterpreted for the outcome of security. If such a reinterpretation is accepta-
ble, it would be important that all arms control elements that manage security issues with 
varied means should have equal value in an overall agreement.  
The old CFE Treaty was designed to establish parity and stability on a lower level be-
tween the two alliances (groups of states parties) in order to prevent a ‘surprise attack’ or 
a ‘large scale offensive action’.18 Russia still has an interest in maintaining a certain level of 
parity vis-á-vis NATO since this would constrain the enlargement of the alliance. But 
NATO countries have rejected such proposals, as they will supposedly not significantly 
contribute to more stability, according to the Alliance. With the existence of one enlarged 
alliance, one smaller, less stable Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Eu-
ropean Union (EU), and an additional mix of larger and smaller independent states, the 
principle of parity is no longer applicable or valid for the whole of Europe. But the case is 
different on the regional level: The adaptation of the CFE Treaty upon the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union by the Tashkent Agreement in Mai 1992 supported the armistice agree-
ments mediated by Russia in the unresolved territorial conflicts of Georgia, Moldova and 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh) to some degree. All these coun-
tries were forced to accept low weapon ceilings based on the principle of parity. Here, low 
limitations and the principle of parity could be still important. 
 
 
16  See “Signing of the Helsinki Final Act”, in: www.osce.org/who/43960 (28.2.2013). 
17  In 1992 Russia initiated the Commonwealth of States Collective Security Treaty (CST) which was signed 
by Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In 1993, Geor-
gia, Azerbaijan and Belarus signed the treaty which entered into force in 1994. In 1999, Azerbaijan, Geor-
gia and Uzbekistan withdrew from the treaty. In 2002, it was updated to the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization and Uzbekistan entered it again in 2006 and left it in 2012.  
18  See Preamble of the CFE Treaty, in: www.acq.osd.mil/tc/treaties/cfe/text.htm#preamble (28.2.2013). 
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The objective of preventing a ‘surprise attack’ or ‘large scale offensive action ’–repeated 
in Article 1 of the adapted CFE Treaty – has lost its previous value for NATO and Russia.19 
A large scale offensive action or a surprise attack seems very unlikely between most CFE 
states in Europe. But in the case of the unresolved territorial conflicts, the threat of a ‘sur-
prise attack’ is real, as the Georgian military intervention against its entity South Ossetia 
demonstrated in 2008. Despite the government in Azerbaijan favoring a diplomatic solution 
for the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, there are also high-ranking Azerbaijani voices who 
do not exclude resorting to military force to end the conflict over the contested enclave.20 
Therefore, it is strongly recommended to maintain the goal of war prevention and the goal 
of prevention of surprise attack for a future agreement.  
In this context, a new important objective will be to prevent destabilizing force con-
centrations of land forces between states parties. The prevention of destabilizing force 
concentrations supports the goal of war prevention and crisis stability.21 The prevention 
of destabilizing force concentrations can also enhance confidence building, security, and 
stability in cases where new NATO members come close or even have a direct border with 
Russia and in cases where large countries like Russia border small neighbors. Here, the 
principle of reciprocity will play an important role. Regulations that prevent threatening 
and destabilizing force concentrations also offer the opportunity to replace the controver-
sial flank limitations of the CFE Treaty. 
The new main goal of conventional arms control should not be limited to maintaining 
military transparency, verification, and accountability of military potentials for all of its 
members. Verified transparency of military potential through the counting of military 
personnel, units, weapons, and other equipment alone is insufficient even if extended 
weapon categories and naval forces were included, as important qualitative factors would 
not be covered. The structure of forces, missions, and military weapons, equipment, its 
support and capabilities are changing. Military units are becoming smaller and more mo-
bile and can be used far from their homeland. This has strengthened potential destabiliz-
ing intervention capabilities. Traditional military weapon systems like heavy battle tanks, 
armored combat vehicles and combat aircraft, mainly limited by the old CFE Treaty, will 
lose their value because of the improving efficiency and accuracy of modern munitions 
and missiles in the compound structure of intelligence, reconnaissance, communication, 
command and control, described as network-centric warfare capability. The growing 
 
 
19   See Article 1, aCFE, in: www.acq.osd.mil/tc/treaties/acfe/adap_treaty.htm#intro (28.2.2013). 
20   See the Azerbaijani First Deputy Speaker of Parliament Ziyafat Asgarov, who emphasized that Azerbaijan 
will use all means to free occupied lands. See “Azerbaijan to use all means to free occupied lands”, in: To-
day.Az 9 July 2012, in: www.today.az/print/news/ politics/110061.html (9.7.2012). 
21  In 2011, the Netherlands tabled a proposal in a similar direction for an update of the Vienna Document to 
clarify concerns about unusual military activities. See “OSCE Inspection for Clarification on military Ac-
tivities giving rise to concern, The Netherlands,” in: FSC. AIAM/12/11, March 1, 2011. Efforts to lower 
the threshold for the notification of military activities are also going into a similar direction: France, Al-
bania, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Czech Re-
public, Slovakia and Sweden want to lower the threshold to 5,000 troops, 100 tanks, 200 ACVs, 80 artillery 
pieces. In: FSC.DEL/107/10/Rev.2/Corr.1, 2 February 2010.  
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vulnerability of such major weapon systems favors a trend towards more unmanned, 
smaller, semi-automatic weapon systems with stealth characteristics in future military 
activities. A simple increase of conventional weapon categories and the inclusion of all 
military services in conventional arms control would only partially match future capabili-
ties of military forces.  
A more comprehensive approach to conventional arms control is necessary, one which 
does not only look to the strengths of selected military weapon categories. Based on the 
conceptual ideas of verified transparency, a new objective should also include transparen-
cy of military capabilities and transparency of military intentions. Transparency of mili-
tary capabilities would go beyond the simple bean counting-approach of military poten-
tials and include important new qualitative factors into future conventional arms control 
which cannot be accounted for otherwise. It would allow for a more realistic assessment 
of what modern conventional forces can and cannot do with regard to their doctrinal 
objectives. This could reduce the overestimation of military capabilities and also threat 
perception. Transparency of military intentions records the goals of military forces which 
usually determine their strength, structure and capabilities. Verified transparency of mili-
tary intentions could therefore demonstrate to what extent they are congruent with mili-
tary potentials, structures and capabilities. They could additionally facilitate the renuncia-
tion of limitations or reduce their value. Military intentions with a defensive orientation 
and military forces and structures that are not oriented towards neighbors reduce de-
mands for limitations and strengthen the concept of verified transparency.  
However, verified transparency alone is always to the advantage of the strongest party 
militarily – currently the Western alliance (Hartmann/Schmidt 2011: 30). Therefore, the 
instrument of limitations as such is still important in order to balance this advantage. 
Limitations seem necessary in three distinct areas: First, to strengthen war prevention and 
crisis stability in the cases of local unregulated territorial conflicts. Second, limitations 
may be necessary to prevent possible future military instabilities. Finally, several countries 
like Russia, Turkey, Greece, Romania and Italy still believe in limitations for different 
political reasons. In the case of Turkey and Greece, they support regional stabilization. 
Therefore, limitations may be necessary to supplement the new conceptual ideas of veri-
fied transparency and should not be seen as a contradiction to them.  
Hence, the CFE and aCFE objectives, “maintaining a secure and stable and balanced 
overall level of conventional armed forces in Europe lower than heretofore” and “of elim-
inating disparities prejudicial to stability and security” should be preserved.22 They repre-
sent the goal of maintaining security on the lowest possible force levels in Europe and 
preventing disparities which can be a risk for future stability and security. Further, NATO 
member states should restate their commitments to restrain from deploying substantial 
combat forces in the new member countries as long as Russia seems willing to accept sim-
ilar constraints in Belarus, Armenia and for the controversial entities South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia.  
 
 
22   See Preamble of the CFE Treaty, in: www.acq.osd.mil/tc/treaties/cfe/text.htm#preamble (28.2.2013). 
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A very controversial objective is the principle of ‘host nation consent’. It allows for the 
deployment of foreign troops only with the explicit consent of a host state. Russia is basi-
cally willing to accept this principle and the wording in the adapted CFE Treaty since it 
ratified the agreement in 2004. However, some state parties want to use this principle 
beyond arms control as a tool for the political regulation of their unresolved territorial 
conflicts. But this has stepped beyond the bounds of arms control. Therefore, the political 
regulation of the frozen conflicts in the Caucasus must be negotiated in the existing polit-
ical institutions (Minsk Process for Nagorno-Karabakh, 5 + 2 Process for Transdniestre 
and Geneva Talks for South Ossetia and Abkhazia).23 Unfortunately, the recognition of 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia by Russia in 2008 has complicated this problem since it en-
hanced the territorial conflict between Western capitals and Moscow. However, there is 
no other option than to separate arms control from the political solutions of these con-
flicts and seek workable compromises on the implementation of the host nation consent 
principle at the end of the negotiations.  
Further, the goal of Global Zero for nuclear weapons has increased the importance of 
conventional asymmetries and their impact on stability in regards to nuclear deterrence. A 
new objective is recommended for this: Conventional arms control should contribute to 
nuclear disarmament and not create new obstacles to it. Finally, all OSCE member states in 
Europe should have the right to enter into a future European arms control regime. This 
shall cover all NATO, CSTO, and EU member countries and independent states.  
5.  Ways Towards a New Agreement 
These new conceptual ideas are still in their early stages of development. Therefore, it is 
important to meet states and experts where they currently stand and listen to their concerns 
and adjust these ideas to them as far as possible. Before a multilateral discussion and negoti-
ations over the new approach are initiated, it is important to begin with bilateral discus-
sions. First, this makes it easier to explain the new approaches in all their facets; secondly, 
one can better respect the different views and concerns of the partner. Subsequently, the 
new approach should be discussed and developed in the Alliance before new negotiations 
with others can start.  
Who should participate in these negotiations? The answer to this question is controver-
sial. In the previous informal talks named ‘to 36 format’ between December 2010 and May 
2011, all 30 CFE state parties and six new NATO countries (Albania, Croatia, Estonia, Lat-
via, Lithuania, and Slovenia) participated. Due to the enlargement of the alliance, these six 
 
 
23   See also Rose Gottemoeller, acting head the Bureau of Arms Control and of International Security in the 
U.S. State Department, who said: “But, of course, international arms control agreements cannot and 
should not resolve all the bilateral and other problems, like the frozen conflicts you mentioned. Such 
agreements, can, however, build confidence between the parties to such territorial disputes and improve 
security in the zone of the conflicts.” Cited: Interview by Elena Chernenko of Kommersant Daily, Mos-
cow, 28 March 2012, in: www.state.gov/t/us/187052.htm (28.2.2013). 
Verified Transparency  13 
 
 
countries are not currently members of the CFE regime. With this step, NATO signaled that 
all Alliance countries could be covered by a new agreement. But Russia requested to open 
this format to other interested European states, thereby reducing the influence of the Alli-
ance in these talks. Some countries, like Switzerland, have a growing interest in these talks. 
However, Western countries fear that an expansion towards other European countries like 
Cyprus could seriously hamper future talks. So a new compromise seems necessary, which 
could include some additional countries in Europe that support arms control. 
Another question is the future structure of conventional arms control in Europe. Should 
the new concept be further developed into an independent CFE follow-up agreement and 
should the Vienna Document 2011 (see Annex II) be adapted to it, or should the new con-
cept be incorporated into the Vienna Document and only create a single agreement? If one 
integrated and politically binding agreement is the goal, it seems easier to integrate the new 
concept into the Vienna Document. But there is no implicit necessity for following this 
resolution. If a legally binding treaty has priority, two separate agreements would be neces-
sary since only the Vienna Document is politically binding. In this case, the Vienna Docu-
ment could be adapted to the new objectives of conventional arms control. The integration 
of enhanced transparency for military doctrines and defense guidelines should also not 
cause too many difficulties. A new, single, integrated comprehensive military data exchange 
measure could be established either in the Vienna Document or the legally binding conven-
tional arms control agreement. In the latter case, data exchanges in the Vienna document 
can either be reduced or terminated to minimize future workload.  
What should happen to the Open Skies Treaty in this context? Due to the fact that the 
Open Skies Treaty is a legally binding regime, has a smaller body of membership, and can 
be used for transparency measures in all arms control agreements, it would be a severe 
mistake to try integrating it into a future conventional arms regime. But a future conven-
tional arms control regime could try to make better use of Open Skies for the purpose of 
observations and inspections. This would further strengthen Open Skies.  
Also, a mechanism would be necessary that regulates the transfer of participants from 
the Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control24 to the new European-wide Agreement, 
thereby covering Croatia as a NATO member. 
A further question is the binding character of this new agreement. Many states such as 
Russia, Turkey, Greece, Romania, Italy and conservative political forces in the U.S.25 want 
 
 
24  The Agreement on Sub-regional Arms Control had been imposed after the violent dissolution of the 
former Yugoslavia between the independent new states of Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia-
Herzegovina in 1996 within the Dayton Peace Process of 1995. In 2006/7 Montenegro became an inde-
pendent member of the agreement after its separation from Serbia. See OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control in: Conventional, Florence, 4 June 1996, in: 
www.oscebih.org/documents/osce_bih_doc_1999073011120616eng.pdf (28.2.2013). 
25  See letter of the Chairman of Subcommittee of Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed Services, Mike 
Rogers, U.S. House of Representative to U.S. Vice President Biden, 30 January 2013, in: www. 
foreignpolicy.com/files/fp_uploaded_documents/130130_Rogers%20Letter%20to%20Biden%2001-30-
2013.pdf (31.1.2013).  
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to preserve the legally binding character of conventional arms control. In principle, a 
legally binding treaty has higher value compared to a politically binding agreement and is 
therefore preferable. But ratification of a legally binding treaty would be a challenging 
task for several reasons: First, the divergent security views in Europe and in North Ameri-
ca will surely increase difficulties for national ratification. Second, the management of 
territorial conflicts is controversial and can create an additional hurdle for ratification. 
Third, any new treaty will take several years to get be ratified. Fourth, the conservatives in 
the U.S. in particular may be very sensitive to the above-mentioned points and have the 
capacity to prevent ratification owning to the fact that the American constitution requires 
the support of two thirds of the Senate. Fifth, as the ratification of New START has 
shown, the price for ratification may be too high compared with any gains attained from a 
new agreement. Furthermore, the question of a new arms control agreement still being 
important enough to justify such a procedure with its inherent high risk of failure re-
mains, along with the alternative of a multinational politically binding agreement seeming 
more appropriate. A multinational political agreement has more binding power than a 
bilateral agreement. The history of the multilateral politically binding CFE 1A agreement 
and the Vienna Document are good examples of this (Zellner 2012: 18). Such agreements 
offer the additional advantage of entering into force immediately after their signature and 
would facilitate future changes.  
6.  Instruments of Modernization for Conventional Arms Control  
The new conceptual ideas of verified transparency would make it necessary to enlarge and 
redefine some known instruments, structure other means of conventional arms control in 
a new way and introduce new means and measures to meet the principles and objectives 
discussed above. But in spite of the necessary changes they should use excisting proce-
dures, rules, measures, and means as much as possible. Here, these ideas are meant to 
differentiate among verified transparency of military potentials and military intentions. 
Verified transparency of military potentials would consist of the command structure of 
military forces (down to the battalion level), the arsenal of military weapons and military 
equipment, and (a new measure) the analysis and evaluation of military capabilities. This 
will make it necessary to enlarge the weapon categories and their support equipment in 
order to fulfill this task. Further, existing definitions of weapon categories should be 
adapted to their technological development. Verified transparency of military intentions 
would be a new instrument (see chapter 6.4). 
The function of existing stabilizing limitations can be replaced and strengthened – 
wherever possible and acceptable – by the timely notification and the multinational ob-
servation of certain military activities if they reach a commonly defined military thresh-
old. Other observable threshold measures should be added to enhance security, accounta-
bility and confidence (see chapter 6.3).  
As in past, nuclear forces and weapons should be excluded from conventional arms con-
trol and dual capable weapons systems (nuclear and conventional) will only be counted and 
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verified in their conventional role. However, Russia has a growing interest in including what 
it calls ‘conventional strategic weapons’ into future bilateral START negotiations with the 
U.S.26 This is currently rejected by the U.S. government, who deems these merely “conven-
tional weapons with strategic range (beyond 5.500 km)”. It seems very likely that this con-
troversy will have an impact on future talks on the modernization of conventional arms 
control in Europe. In this regard, it should be emphasized that verified transparency, in its 
logic, covers all conventional weapons with strategic ranges that would be deployed in and 
around Europe to conduct missions in and for European security, should they not other-
wise be regulated. New cyber weapon systems can, to a certain degree, substitute the mili-
tary tasks of conventional forces by threats and attacks against civil and military infrastruc-
ture (telecommunication, electricity, water supply). But they will be excluded here due to 
their very different characteristics and low transparency and must be regulated in a separate 
manner.27  
6.1  Transparency of conventional potentials  
Transparency of military potentials provides the basis for all other measures. In contrast 
to the CFE regime, it should be based on an extended approach to cover all relevant new 
technological and military developments of conventional forces which can have an impact 
on military security and stability. This means existing weapon categories should be rede-
fined to include new smaller and lighter weapon types with similar or enhanced fire pow-
er, as in the case of combat vehicles. All weapon and equipment definitions should cover 
semi-automatic and automatic systems as in the CFE Treaty since they are set to have a 
growing impact on future warfare capabilities. New weapon and force categories should 
likewise be added. Conventional air and missile defense systems,28 which are mobile or 
can be used for area defense, like Patriot or SM-3 and the Russian SA-300/-400/-500, 
should be included, as should short range missile systems like the Russian SS-26 Iskander 
as their potential counterpart. Separate information is necessary for special and rapid 
response forces on account of their playing the greatest role for offensive operations and 
interventions. This must be supplemented by transparency of military air and sealift forc-
es which are also important for the analysis and evaluation of sustainability, deployability 
and intervention capability. Paramilitary forces must be covered since they offer the op-
portunity to circumvent transparency of regular troops, especially if weapon systems are 
transferred to them. On the procedural level, any update of the Protocol of Existing Type 
 
 
26  See Cernenko, Elena/Safronov, Ivan, No breakthrough on nuclear arms control, in: Russia Beyond the 
Headlines 18th February 2013, in: http://rbth.ru/international/2013/02/18/no_breakthroughs_ 
on_nuclear_arms_reduction_23009.html (18.2.2013). 
27  Since 2010, there have been bilateral talks between Russia and the U.S. on a code of conduct for cyber 
security. See Gorman, Siobhan, U.S. Backs Talks on Cyber Warfare, in: Wall Street Journal, 4 June 2010, 
in: http://online.wsj.com/article/ SB10001424052748703340904575284964215965730.html# (4.6.10).  
28  It is in the logic of verified transparency to cover conventional missile defense in Europe, but this does not 
exclude a separate regulation (such as by military cooperation) for conventional missile defense in Europe 
outside a new conventional arms control agreement.  
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(POET) of Conventional Armaments and Military Equipment should no longer be based 
on the consensus of all participants in order to reduce the risk of a new blockade.29  
In contrast to CFE, it is strongly recommended to move beyond the covered land and 
air forces and include conventional naval forces of the participants as well. Naval forces, 
which are not only procured for coastal defense, have a regional and global reach and can 
be concentrated in order to deny other states access to or from the high seas. They can 
further be used for the landing of land forces (marines) and also have a growing capability 
to threaten or attack targets at sea and on land with high precision long range cruise mis-
siles or sea-based combat aircraft and helicopters (over 90 percent of the global land terri-
tory are in striking distance of naval weapon systems with a range of 900 nautical miles). 
Additionally, the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and its security are of growing value 
for many states with adjacent sea areas. Therefore, transparency and verification of naval 
forces can contribute to greater accountability and confidence building in this area too. A 
further argument for transparency of naval forces is that Russia has many of its sub-
strategic nuclear weapons earmarked for its sea forces (Zagorski 2011: 17, 18) in order to 
balance conventional superiority of Western sea forces. More transparency of conven-
tional naval forces increases their accountability and can thereby facilitate further reduc-
tions of naval sub-strategic nuclear weapons. Transparency measures should cover all 
conventional naval forces of European states and include all sea forces for the U.S. and 
Canada with missions/deployment in the North Atlantic and high sea areas around Eu-
rope for security tasks in Europe.  
The enhanced transparency of conventional military equipment is not entirely new. 
Since 1994, the annual ‘Global Exchange of Military Information’ has contained ever 
more information about conventional land, air and naval forces.30 Furthermore, the in-
troduction of new major weapon systems must be notified. The Vienna Document even 
goes so far as to demand demonstrations of new weapon systems to other participants as a 
confidence-building measure (see Annex II). The ‘Annual Exchange of Military Infor-
mation of the Vienna Document’ contains figures about active and non-active units and 
offers thereby basic information about mobilization capability. It also presents separate 
figures for land-based naval combat aircraft that were excluded from the CFE Treaty in 
1991. Since 1994, the ‘Annual Information Exchange on Defense Planning and Military 
Budgets’ – now a part of the Vienna Document 2011 – contains, beyond that, additional 
data about transport aircraft and air defense missile systems. Additionally, it covers the 
 
 
29  Since 1997, the update of this protocol has been blocked because of the consensus rule and the unresolved 
differences between Russia and the USA on the exact classification of certain combat vehicle types.  
30  It includes information about armored combat vehicles with fixed antitank missile launchers, transport 
helicopters, and transport aircraft, all combat aircraft (with a separate figure of combat aircraft on aircraft 
carriers), primary trainer aircraft, surface warships with more than 400 t displacement fully loaded and 
submarines with more than 50 t displacement submerged (Global Exchange of Military Information 
1994). Transparency measures of CFE include main battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery sys-
tems (100 mm caliber and more), combat aircraft, attack helicopters, bridge laying equipment, primary 
trainer aircraft, and personnel strength of conventional land and air forces. See CFE Treaty, Art. II, Para. 
1, Sub-para. q., in: www.osce.org/library/14087 (28.2.2013). 
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structure and aggregate data of naval forces, including figures on fleet strength, the medi-
cal service, and force support elements for all forces. Many elements of the necessary in-
formation for verified transparency are currently available to some degree in military data 
exchanges of various regimes. They must now only be adapted, integrated into a single 
exchange, and further developed according to a new function and role. In this context, 
several existing information exchanges can be considered and either closed or markedly 
reduced with a new agreement, thereby reducing workload and costs. A larger, single 
information exchange measure will also significantly facilitate the analysis and evaluation 
of military data.  
Because the new conceptual ideas envisage no constraints, they will not limit military 
weapons or forces in any way against external threats outside the application area. There-
fore, it no longer seems necessary to exclude certain territorial areas near the border of 
non-regime neighbors from transparency measures of this agreement, as in the case of 
Turkey (near the border of Iran, Syria and Iraq), under the legally binding CFE and the 
politically binding Vienna Document.31  
Furthermore, all state parties should annually notify their complete conventional hold-
ings of the covered weapon categories and other military equipment in Europe. The noti-
fication should include deployed forces in guest states and in unrecognized entities like 
Transdniestre and Nagorno-Karabakh or in entities with a controversial status like Ab-
khazia or South Ossetia, in the area of application. In particular, Armenia should no long-
er hide a large amount of its forces in Nagorno-Karabakh without informing member 
states. This would increase transparency and accountability between Armenian and Azer-
baijani forces. In the case of Georgia, the issue is even more complicated since Russia has 
recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states whereas Georgia and all 
other relevant countries oppose this new status. A dual track approach seems necessary to 
manage such conflicts. On the one hand, Russia should have no problem with declaring 
its troops in these ‘independent states’ as deployed forces. But Georgia and Western coun-
tries could not accept this due to the fact that it could be seen as an indirect recognition of 
these two entities. The other countries should accept Russian figures but reject the status 
of these two entities in a special diplomatic note. Spain’s behavior with the notification of 
British weapons on Gibraltar can be used as a model.  
6.2  Transparency of military capabilities 
Transparency, analysis and evaluation of military capabilities could here be utilized as an 
entirely new instrument. The old CFE Treaty prevented two sorts of military capabilities: 
surprise and comprehensive attacks between alliances. But the new approach is not in-
tended to limit or prevent military capabilities per se, as some might wrongly assume. It 
merely offers a new opportunity to receive more information on the quality of military 
 
 
31  Turkey is also a member of the Open Skies Treaty, which covers, in contrast to CFE and Vienna Docu-
ment, the whole territory of the country including all islands. Observation flights can only be changed or 
canceled if the observed party cannot guarantee flight safety. 
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forces. The main purpose of this measure is to show other participants the capabilities of 
conventional forces in order to enhance accountability and confidence.  
The evaluation of military capabilities will be a purely national assessment and will 
generally not be fully comparable to the assessment of other states. As long as this assess-
ment method increases transparency, accountability and trust and thereby calms security 
concerns, the measure should raise no further problems. If it increases security concerns 
for an inspecting party, then this state would be required to communicate its national 
assessment to other state parties and convince them to deal with the issue. In the latter 
case, this shall be seen as a warning signal for security and stability and could potentially 
lead to further negotiations and regulations. The analysis and evaluation of military capa-
bilities can also facilitate nuclear disarmament, since it could be easier to identify poten-
tial destabilizing conventional developments and asymmetries for smaller and more vul-
nerable nuclear forces and weapons.  
Answering the questions of which military capabilities should be covered and which 
information and data are necessary for each capability must be negotiated. The quality of 
confidence building depends on a sufficient number of capabilities and on the inclusion 
of modern capabilities that can enhance military fighting and fire power to a high degree, 
such as the stand-off capability or the capability of network-centric warfare operations. 
The number and definition of capabilities can be selected under a common sense rule. A 
possible list could potentially include the following military capabilities:  
• Sustainability 
• Deployability 
• Readiness 
• Stand-off capability 
• Intervention capability 
• Network centric warfare operations capability 
• Intelligence and reconnaissance 
• Interoperability 
• Responsiveness 
• Logistics 
One problem of conventional arms control is that it can only be based on countable and 
verifiable items and categories. Therefore, it is necessary to determine key accountable 
and verifiable information elements in advance for every capability in order to create a 
reliable and valid basis for analysis and assessment. During negotiations, it may be helpful 
to arrange test data exchanges and test inspections to clarify the complexity of efforts and 
the quality of results.  
6.3  Additional confidence and security building measures 
Confidence building is the most important goal of the new agreement. It should be focused 
on covering regional and military areas where mistrust seems particularly high. Here, some 
new rules and the adjustment of others can enhance confidence and accountability. 
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Deployment rule 
Owing to the fact that Russia still fears NATO enlargement, a strengthening of the Western 
commitment to not deploy substantial combat forces (air and land forces)32 in (new) mem-
ber states seems necessary, as long as no new threat arises. As a reciprocal measure, Russia 
should be willing to accept the same restraints including possible new deployments in Bela-
rus and Armenia. Because of the unresolved status conflict of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
Russia should announce constraints in these entities. The state parties shall negotiate new 
thresholds for the notification and observation of such deployments (including temporary 
deployments): new deployments and withdrawals of small units will be announced, though 
they should not be deemed substantial deployments. Additionally, a new threshold should 
be defined for substantial deployments (including rotational deployments) of land and air 
forces.33 In case this threshold is reached or exceeded, an additional notification is necessary 
in advance, with the inclusion of a strong rationale for it. Other participants shall have the 
right to observe this deployment. If it lasts for a longer time, this notification must be con-
firmed again after three months and can be observed again by other participants. The prin-
ciple goal of this measure is to prevent the deployment of significant forces. It does not es-
tablish limits for the new deployment of foreign forces that serve the interests of Baltic 
States, but, for all intents and purposes, has the effect of approximating a limit. A major 
problem of this measure could be that observations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia will be 
not possible as long as the status conflict is not resolved. If necessary, this rule can be ex-
tended to possible deployments of conventional weapons with strategic ranges. 
Concentration rule 
Due to the growing mobility of conventional land forces, the capability of concentrating 
forces over great distances will continue to rise. This is particularly true for NATO, EU and 
CSTO members. Therefore, it is important to enhance stability and security and to reduce 
the concerns about unusual concentrations of land forces by their advanced announcement 
and through multinational regular observations without the right of refusal. Every concen-
tration of land forces within a certain territorial area that is near a border34 involving more 
than five percent of the national holdings should be notified. In deployments exceeding 10 
 
 
32  See NATO Statement on CFE, Cypher 10, Brussels, 8 December 1998, in: www.nato.int/docu/pr/1998/ 
p98-141e.htm (28.2.2013) and also Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between 
NATO and the Russian Federation signed in Paris 27 May 1997, Part IV Political Military Matters, in: 
www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_25468.htm (28.2.2013). In 2008 NATO countries withdraw 
this commitment for the air forces. See NAC Statement on CFE, Cypher 5, Brussels, 28 March 2008 in: 
www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-047e.html (28.2.2013).  
33  In 2008, Russia proposed that the deployment of a brigade, combat wing, attack helicopter battalion or 41 
tanks, 188 ACVs, 90 artillery pieces, 24 combat aircraft or 24 attack helicopters could meet the definition 
of substantial combat forces (Antonov/Ajumov 2012: 44). NATO countries admit their readiness to de-
velop a definition for substantial combat forces with Russia upon an agreement of the parallel action 
package. See NAC Statement on CFE, Brussels, 28 March 2008, Cypher 5 (see Fn. 32). 
34  Russia and Kazakhstan have accepted similar restraints through the Agreement between the Russian 
Federation, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and China on Mutual Reduction 
of Military Forces in Border Regions (Moscow, 24 April 1997) towards China (Agreement on Mutual Re-
duction of Military Forces in Border Regions 1997). 
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percent, the activity should be observed by a multinational inspection team.35 Mutual politi-
cally binding ‘no-increase’ commitments for military forces in certain regions and areas can 
further strengthen this rule.36 Such a counting rule works fine for states of similar size and 
forces. However, in cases where a small state like Georgia borders a large state like Russia, 
this rule is inappropriate. Russia has 5.000 tanks and Georgia only 180. With a five or ten 
percent threshold, Russia can concentrate 249 to 499 tanks near Georgia without announc-
ing it, whereas Georgia can only concentrate 8 to 17 tanks. Here, based on the principle of 
reciprocity, more appropriate thresholds should be negotiated for notifications and obser-
vations near the border on a multilateral level that better balance such asymmetries. Figures 
for the threshold can be oriented on a battalion sized level or slightly above. 
Also, unusual concentrations37 of sea forces (excluding submarines) near the coast of a 
state party (near or in the exclusive economic zone) beyond a defined threshold can be 
announced in advance and observed by a multinational observer team to enhance ac-
countability and confidence. In such a case, observers should have the right to survey 
these concentrations either from the command room of the command ship and/or from a 
naval command center on land of the nation leading this force. Here, an observation on a 
command ship should be possible even on high seas, if no other opportunity exists to 
observe this activity.  
Military activity rules 
Military activities are much smaller than in the past because of the transformed force 
structures and the enhanced use of computer simulations for cost reasons. It therefore 
seems necessary to lower the thresholds for notification and observation of military activi-
ties in the Vienna Document 2011 in order to reestablish the lost level of accountability to 
some degree.38 Independent, large air force activities or air-sea activities should also be 
announced in advance in order to enhance accountability and confidence. But, at present, 
it is not possible to observe large air force activities.  
 
 
35  This measure can further be strengthened by the request of a concerned state party to convene a confer-
ence of all state parties. It is based on Article 8 (B) and Article 19, 2 of aCFE, in: www.acq.osd.mil/ 
tc/treaties/acfe/adap_treaty.htm (1.3.2013).  
36  With the signature of the adapted CFE Treaty, several states accepted special politically binding restraints 
in sensitive areas (such as Russia in the Oblast Pskov and Kaliningrad) in Istanbul in 1999. However, the 
value of these special commitments seems questionable in that the adapted treaty has never entered into 
force. Therefore, only the commitments of the NATO-Russia Founding Act (see Fn. 32) now seem valid. 
37  Unusual force concentrations for the purpose of disaster relief or other emergencies are excluded. They 
are generally not accompanied by the mobilization of (large amounts) of munitions.  
38  At present, state parties must notify announce military activities if they involve 9,000 troops, 250 tanks, 
500 ACVs, 250 artillery pieces, 200 aircraft sorties (including helicopters) or 3,000 troops for amphibious 
landing, heliborne landing or parachute assault. See Vienna Document 2011, Cypher (40.1.1 – 40.2.1). 
France, Albania, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, Italy, Luxemburg, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Sweden propose lower thresholds of 5,000 troops, 100 tanks, 200 ACVs and 
80 artillery pieces. See FSC.DEL/107/10/Rev.2/Corr.1 dated 2nd February 2010. 
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Transit Rule 
The transit of land forces either to another country in the zone of application or through 
the zone of application should be notified in advance and not exceed a duration of 21 days 
through the zone and 42 days in the zone.39  
These, partly overlapping, security and confidence building rules offer several addi-
tional advantages: They can be used to replace the controversial flank limits (see Annex I) 
of the CFE Treaty, thereby fulfilling an old demand by Russia and Ukraine. They also 
create better early warning measures for war preparations in the case of unregulated terri-
torial conflicts with the unusual force concentration rule and the lowered threshold of 
observable military activities. Additionally, they can help minimize mistrust between East 
Central European NATO members and Russia. On the Western side, this is particularly 
true for the Baltic States. These countries are also opposed to the withdrawal of American 
sub-strategic nuclear weapons from Europe. Malcolm Chalmers described this problem as 
follows: “One of the ironies in this whole debate about nonstrategic nuclear weapons in 
Europe is the countries that have them don’t want them and the countries that don’t have 
them want the ones who don’t want them to keep them.40” Such measures can likewise 
facilitate further withdrawal of U.S. sub-strategic nuclear weapons systems from Europe. 
Further confidence building measures can be negotiated either on a multilateral or bi-
lateral level. They can include the following measures: 41 
• one or more additional observations of small-scale military activity, particularly 
near a mutual border; 
• mutual restraints in the increase of military forces, deployed forces;  
• information of the deployment of new units and the introduction of new major 
weapons in a defined regional area;  
• more frequent invitations for visits to military bases of all services;  
• more mutual communication in military affairs, for example in regards to small-
scale military activities and their regulations at the mutual border;  
• regular exchanges of military personnel from all services. 
This list of measures is surely not exhaustive. It demonstrates that there are enough 
means to enhance military confidence and accountability. The central question is whether 
there is enough political will on all concerned sides to enter into negotiations on such 
measures and implement them on a regular basis. 
 
 
39  This measure is based on the transit rule of the adapted CFE Treaty, Art. 5, 3; in: www.acq.osd.mil/tc/ 
treaties/acfe/adap_treaty.htm (28.2.2013).  
40  Citation: Oswald, Rachel, “NATO Should Use Summit to Address U.S. Tactical Nukes in Europe, Experts 
Say,” in. Global security newswire, 11 May 2012, in: www.nti.org/gsn/article/nato-should-use-summit-
address-us-tactical-nukes-europe-experts-say/ (11.5.2013). 
41  In this context, it should be noted that Poland and some other East Central European countries have 
several bilateral agreements with their neighbours for additional confidence building measures.  
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6.4  Transparency and verification of military intentions 
Clearly it is impossible to analyze and evaluate military intentions with 100 percent cer-
tainty. But Europe has reached a stable security situation which is supported by a certain 
level of military dialogue and transparency. This quality in interstate relations makes it 
very unlikely that Europe will witness any sharp change in military intentions in the short 
term. Verified transparency of military intentions will strengthen this fact and thereby 
increase confidence. And verified information about defensive military intentions can 
contribute to balancing conventional military asymmetries as long as they have no impact 
on military stability.42  
The new approach is based on some redundancy through several layers of infor-
mation, analysis and evaluation of military intentions in order to increase the reliability of 
data. As a first layer, states should regularly disclose information about their military doc-
trines and defense guidelines, defense planning and defense budget. As a second layer, the 
regular observation of one or two of their largest military maneuvers should be allowed 
every two or three years with no right of refusal. In such maneuvers, military forces try to 
implement the goals of their military doctrines and defense guidelines. This measure goes 
beyond the present regulations of the Vienna document 2011, which allows the observa-
tion of military activities only in cases where certain very high thresholds are exceeded.43 
Therefore, the Vienna document or a new agreement should incorporate this additional 
measure. It can provide observers with some knowledge as to the extent to which military 
forces are able to fulfill their respective national defense doctrines and guidelines. As a 
third layer, transparency of the structure and deployment of forces will supplement the 
military picture in this regard. These instruments can, altogether, grant effective insight 
into military intentions with sufficient reliability.  
The exchange of information on military doctrines and its discussion is not an entirely 
new measure. Many state parties, including Russia, publish their security and military 
doctrines voluntarily.44 Many OSCE governments have participated in the exchange and 
discussion of their doctrines at the OSCE High Level military doctrine seminars in 1990, 
1991, 1998, 2001, 2006 and 2011 on a voluntary basis.45 Additionally, all OSCE members 
are obligated, according to chapter II of the Vienna Document (Defense Planning), to 
provide all other members with information about their military doctrine, defense policy, 
defense planning and defense budget (Vienna Document 2011: Cypher 15.1 – 15.4.4.2). 
 
 
42  There exists no common definition of ‘military stability’ in spite of the fact that this term plays an im-
portant role for all state parties. It depends on the present security issue and the development of a com-
mon view on it to come to a common definition of military stability. 
43  Observations of military activities are only possible if the following thresholds are reached: 13,000 troops, 
300 tanks, 500 ACVs, 250 artillery pieces or 3,500 troops for amphibious landing, heliborne landing or 
parachute assault. See Vienna Document 2011, Cypher (47.7). 
44  For example Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, the Neth-
erlands, Norway, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Turkey, and the USA have voluntarily published their doctrines.  
45  See Vienna Document 2011, Cypher (15.7) and OSCE Press Release, Seminar on Military Doctrine pro-
motes transparency, openness, Vienna, 14 February 2006, in: www.osce.org/fsc/47108 (28.2.2013).  
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Information and discussion of military doctrines are not only important for reasons of 
transparency but also a necessary precondition for greater military cooperation. So it 
would not seem to require a very large leap to do these things on a slightly more regulated 
and enhanced basis and in a regular exchange with other states.  
Up until now, there has been no obligation for an information exchange on defense 
guidelines. However, a few states, like Germany (Defense Policy Guidelines 2011) and the 
USA, publish their defense guidelines on a voluntary basis. In the future, the term ‘de-
fense policy and doctrine’ in the Vienna Document (Vienna Document 2011: Cypher 
15.1) can be extended to ‘defense policy, guidelines and doctrine’ to cover defense guide-
lines and, in the annex of the document, the definition of these guidelines and their con-
tents could be presented.  
Within the defined initial phase of a new agreement, all participating states should ex-
change their newest military doctrines and defense guidelines. In order to reduce efforts 
and costs, they should only confirm the newest doctrine and guidelines in the following 
annual information exchange, being that most states revise them only after a major 
change of the security situation or after elections, and not every year. Every official revi-
sion of a military doctrine and a defense guideline should be recorded in the following 
annual information exchange.  
6.5  Verification of military potentials 
The CFE Treaty has the aim of verifying current holdings of covered weapon systems and 
evaluating their compliance with existing ceilings and limitations for each participant. 
Because the new approach has no limitations or ceilings, the new objective is different: it 
will only verify the notified actual holdings with some additional information.  
The current practice of verification raises several problems for a future agreement. 
Russia has largely reduced the number of conventional arms control inspectors on ac-
count of suspending the CFE Treaty at the end of 2007 and has had no interest in raising 
the number to the previous level for cost reasons. Other states like the Netherlands and 
Great Britain have reduced their inspection agency for financial reasons as well or because 
they do not really believe in a future of conventional arms control. Many participants, like 
Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, and Hungary have a strong interest in lowering the burden 
of inspection costs. An additional issue is that the inspections of Western countries are 
primarily aimed towards Russia and Belarus, whereas Russia is primarily interested in 
inspections of NATO members. And both (NATO countries and Russia) control the 
countries with unresolved territorial conflicts to some degree. Furthermore, NATO coun-
tries have agreed through an MOU not to inspect one another. This has created a very 
unbalanced structure of inspections over time.  
This raises the question as to whether a multilateral institution for inspections, similar 
to the OPCW or the IAEA, could better serve the interests of the state parties, particularly 
under tightened budgets and a likely growing number of participants. It would offer sev-
eral advantages: Routine inspections of military potentials by the technical secretariat of 
the new agency based on random or on a certain key for the inspection of all participants 
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can solve the problem of the unbalanced structure. Additionally, a multinational inspec-
tion agency would help to reduce the costs for general evaluation, observation and inspec-
tion visits. The inspection of military equipment and units and the observation of military 
activities for examining military intentions and the observation of military concentrations 
beyond certain thresholds can both be conducted by this new agency. Also, all data and 
information exchanges and notifications can be gathered there and distributed to the 
participants. But there are also some disadvantages: A multinational inspection agency 
cannot build confidence in the same way and with the same efficiency as is the case in 
direct inspections between state inspection agencies. If confidence building is a major goal 
for a future agreement, a multinational inspection agency seems to be less well suited. 
And small states that only participate by passive inspections in an inspection regime for 
cost reasons may be forced to pay a little bit more for a multinational inspection agency.  
At present, many state parties are forced to spend money for inspectors and inspections 
as well as for the analytical work, documentation, electronic archiving and other tasks. A 
central multinational agency would reduce such costs for every participant. And since all 
state parties would have access to the inspection reports, no duplication of an inspection 
would be necessary. A State can provide their inspectors and name certain experts for spe-
cial inspections and/or offer a financial contribution for this new multinational verification 
agency according to their economic and financial situation and the agreed cost sharing.  
As mentioned before, only the inspection of certain military capabilities should be con-
ducted by a lead nation, being that such inspections are rare and need special expertise 
that a multinational institution presumably cannot provide in a cost-effective manner. 
Such direct inspections would also have a heightened effect for confidence building and 
would lower this disadvantage of a multinational agency.  
In the past, the U.S. has always opposed such a multinational institution for several 
reasons: First, it was not willing to transfer such important control and steering rights to 
an external institution and, secondly, it feared it could strengthen conventional arms con-
trol too much and thereby further weaken NATO. But under the current situation, when 
most participants are forced to reduce their budget deficits, a multinational verification 
agency seems to be more cost effective. The U.S. government can further demonstrate its 
strong commitment to conventional arms control and conventional stability with its po-
litical support for such an agency and thereby increase its credibility for its Global Zero 
goal of nuclear weapons.  
However, verification of conventional military forces of a state party near the border of 
countries which do not participate in the regime can be difficult or even impossible if they 
are involved in current operational missions that concern a state or states outside the 
agreement. In such a case, special verification exceptions may be necessary for defined terri-
torial areas or zones (as little as possible) which verge on non-regime neighbors. In order to 
keep this possible loophole as limited as possible, all special verification exceptions should 
always be announced and this information should be repeated after a certain timeframe of 
three or six months. The notification of such exceptional events, which should, in principle, 
be as short and small as possible, should include details about their duration, the excluded 
area and the reason for it. A prolongation of this exception should be possible.  
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6.6  Verification of naval forces 
Inspections of naval forces need special regulations since they are too expensive on or 
above the high seas and can seriously hamper ongoing sea operations. Furthermore, the 
control of sea forces on the international high seas does not seem possible in a reliable 
manner even by use of the Open Skies Treaty.46 For these reasons they have been excluded 
here. Inspections of naval forces should be possible in European home ports only. Here, 
arms control regulations should not make a distinction between national and multina-
tional forces and rather cover both categories. In 2012, Germany voluntarily invited ob-
servers to a visit of a marine base under the Vienna Document 2011 in the city of Kiel, 
including the visit of ships, which demonstrated that observation and verification of ma-
rine forces are possible at their home port locations (German FSC-Invitation 18 February 
2012). However, this raises difficulties for the U.S. and Canadian navies since they have 
no home ports for their conventional vessels, ships and submarines in Europe.47 For this 
reason, U.S. and Canadian vessels, ships and submarines that have no home port in Eu-
rope but are deployed and/or operate in European waters should be inspected in Europe-
an ports as well, with consent of the host state. This measure would not completely serve 
the principle of reciprocity, but otherwise Canada and the USA would be forced to open 
their homeports on their territory along the Atlantic for inspections. If a state party de-
mands a ship inspection from another participant in its homeport(s), the inspected party 
should consent within a certain timeframe of up to six months, as vessels, ships and sub-
marines can stay outside of their homeports for several months during operational mis-
sions and any interruption would be to costly. This is also the reason why vessels, ships 
and submarines should be excluded from challenge inspections. They may not be possible 
in most cases, or would be too expensive and can seriously affect ongoing operations of 
the concerned sea unit.  
6.7  Verification of military capabilities  
Inspection of military capabilities is a new challenge. A new system of regular, annual 
data exchange should provide all the information necessary for verification of capabilities. 
For example, information as to transportation capability of forces is an important con-
tributing factor for the analysis and evaluation of military capability, of sustainability, or 
intervention capability. Therefore, military transportation equipment from all services, 
which generally do not have combat missions and may not be heavily armed, should be 
defined, included and counted on a regular basis. Further voluntary data should be possi-
ble if one state is not fully satisfied with the results of such special inspection. Due to the 
much higher requirements, the frequency of capability inspections should be limited. 
 
 
46  Here, I thank Hartwig Spitzer for his thoughtful advice. 
47  In Europe, the U.S. Navy currently uses four major bases: Naval Station Rota in Spain, Naval Support 
Activity in Naples and Naval Air Station in Sigonella in Italy and Naval Support Activity Souda Bay in 
(Crete) Greece; U.S. ships are stationed in Italy but have no homeports there. See Commander Navy In-
stallations Command, Regions and Installations, in: www.cnic.navy.mil/CNIC_HQ_Site/ RegionsAnd In-
stallations/index.htm (28.2.2013).  
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Every active state party should have the right to one or two of these capability inspections 
within a time period of three to five years and every passive state party is not obliged to 
accept more than three inspections within the same time period in order to reduce work-
load and costs. Capability inspections can include several military bases, installations and 
sites at the same time and/or consecutively. Such measures do not compare with a simple 
inspection of weapon systems and other military equipment in one or two military bases 
presently called Objects of Verification (OoVs). Capability inspections should only be 
conducted under the responsibility of a lead nation and can be accompanied by inspectors 
and experts from other nations as well as a representative from the proposed multination-
al verification agency. The reason for this procedure was mentioned earlier in this report. 
Capability inspections require highly educated special experts who are usually too expen-
sive for permanent duty in an international agency. Capability inspections need some 
time for preparation and cannot be arranged overnight. For this reason, they cannot be a 
part of challenge inspections. 
7.  Final Remarks  
The new conceptual ideas of verified transparency demand a novel way of thinking about 
conventional arms control. Being that they are based on a certain degree of confidence, 
limitations would no longer seem necessary. The combination of verified military poten-
tials, verified intentions and additional confidence and security building measures can 
substitute military limitations to a high degree, though perhaps not completely. The ex-
tent to which limitations are actually necessary needs to be further discussed, particularly 
in relation to military security of the unregulated territorial conflicts and for areas where 
they might be important for maintaining regional stability.  
The extension of transparency by the integration of additional force and weapon cate-
gories, along with their support equipment, via the introduction of the analysis and evalu-
ation of military capabilities and intentions is aimed at the main problem of European 
security: the growing mistrust, particularly in Russia. It should serve to alleviate the vi-
cious circle of mutual growing mistrust and enhance military accountability and confi-
dence on all sides. The analysis and evaluation of military capabilities can also facilitate 
the identification of new military instabilities.48 The new confidence and security building 
measures strengthen war prevention and crisis stability, especially for state parties with 
unregulated territorial conflicts through the advanced announcement and observation of 
unusual force concentrations or deployments. Furthermore, these measures can function-
ally replace the controversial flank rule or flank limits. The new deployment rule would 
also increase military accountability for NATO enlargement. If significant land or air 
force combat troops were deployed in new member states, it would have to be notified in 
 
 
48  See Grossman, Elaine M., Do Advanced Conventional Weapons Make Nuclear War More Likely? in: NTI 
Global Security Newswire 22 August 2012, in: www.nti.org/gsn/article/jury-out-do-advanced-
conventional-weapons-make-nuclear-war-more-likely/ (28.2.2013).  
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advance, justified with convincing arguments and regularly observed in order to prevent 
such deployments. Russia and others members must accept the same rule in order to en-
hance the security of their neighbors.  
The establishment of the proposed new verification agency could be a strong com-
mitment for the future of conventional arms control in Europe. It could contribute in 
overcoming many structural problems of the current verification system and help to re-
duce the costs of verification.  
The debate about the conceptual ideas of verified transparency has been initiated. Dis-
cussions should now be broadened in order to extend the discussion and learn from its pros 
and cons. The new instruments of verified transparency of military capabilities and the veri-
fied transparency of military intentions surely need further discussion to answer some re-
maining questions. Are they really necessary and how should they be structured? Is it possi-
ble to identify sufficiently detailed elements which are countable and verifiable for all the 
mentioned military capabilities? To what extent will they actually improve the qualitative 
assessment and knowledge about military forces? To which degree will it be possible and 
necessary to include naval forces related to European security in these new conceptual ide-
as? Should conventional missile defense be a part of a future conventional arms control 
agreement or separately regulated through measures of military cooperation? Should verifi-
cation be organized in a new multinational verification agency or should the present struc-
ture of national organization be maintained? There are many questions which must be dis-
cussed on a government and expert level if the new conceptual ideas of verified 
transparency or elements can become a part of a novel alliance concept and future negotia-
tions. Should this come to fruition, it would be worthwhile to establish several international 
experts groups alongside government talks. They could discuss selected questions in further 
detail and develop possible solutions and propose them to the track I level.  
With the election of President Obama for a second term and the nomination of Chuck 
Hagel as the new head of the Defense Department and John Kerry as the new head of the 
State Department, the future fate of conventional arms control looks a little bit more 
hopeful. Conventional arms control still has a small chance of successful revival. The con-
ventional military superiority of the U.S. is not necessarily an obstacle to an agreement 
since both Russia and the U.S. have a common interest in keeping the security situation in 
Europe stable and calm in order to have more military flexibility in Asia, the Middle East 
and other less stable areas. European states, deeply challenged by their financial and eco-
nomic problems, should also welcome a new conventional arms control agreement since 
it will help them reduce costs.  
However, a major hurdle for further talks on conventional arms control is the perspec-
tive of conventional missile defense in Europe. For Russia, it is the litmus test for future 
arms control.49 President Obama must offer more transparency and accountability of 
 
 
49  See Statement by Andrey Denisov, First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, at the Open-
ing of the 11th European Conference on Security and Defense, Berlin, November 27, 2012, in: 
www.mid.ru/ brp_4.nsf/0/3FEF48B1980462A544257AC400293E26 (28.2.2013). 
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conventional missile defense in Europe (Pifer 2012: 2-3) as he hinted to the previous Rus-
sian President Medvedev in Seoul in March 2012. After the re-election of Obama, Mos-
cow has lowered its demands for constraints on missile defense and it no longer insists on 
legally binding obligations.50 The next meeting between Obama and Putin in 2013 will 
show if the reset in arms control will continue and Obama can offer more flexibility in 
missile defense in order to revive conventional arms control talks. 
Following five years of Russian suspension of the CFE Treaty, there is a growing need 
to revive transparency of conventional Russian forces. Verification of Russian forces 
through Open Skies and the Vienna Document do not offer the same quality of infor-
mation. In particular, smaller states like Georgia, Azerbaijan and the Baltic States should 
have a greater interest in receiving more information about Russian conventional force 
modernization efforts.  
Even Eastern Central European alliance members and other state parties should rec-
ognize that we cannot solve our security problems in Europe by the Western alliance 
alone and exclude Russia, particularly under tightened budgets in Europe and the USA. 
This is only possible with a cooperative approach. The same is true for many unregulated 
territorial conflicts in Europe. Without Russia, no stable political regulation seems possi-
ble. A new arms control agreement could improve the outlook for a possible political 
solution to these territorial conflicts more than without. Therefore, Western countries 
should take Russian security concerns seriously and look for some common solutions. A 
future conventional arms control agreement could reestablish lost confidence, strengthen 
the OSCE and ease cooperation in other areas as well (Möckli 2012: 1-4). Conventional 
arms control in and for Europe thus needs more political attention in the next years; we 
could otherwise let this instrument slip from our hands and cause global Nuclear Zero to 
remain a distant dream.  
 
 
50  See Fn. 26. In this context, it seems to be a constructive decision on the part of the new head of the U.S. 
Defense Department, Chuck hagel, to cancel the planned deployment of Phase IV missile defense missiles 
(SM-3B) in Europe for financial reasons. See N.N., US changes in missile defense plan may provide open-
ing for new arms-control talks with Russia, in: Washington Post, 16 March 2013, in www. 
Washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-changes-in missile-defense-plan-may-provide-opening-
for-new-arms-control-talks-with-russia/2013/03/16/88bdae86-8e0d-11e2-adca-74ab31da3399_story.html 
(20.3.2013). For the Russian reactions see N.N., Moscow Needs Explanations on US Missile Shield 
Changes, in: RIA Novosti 19.3.2013, in: http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20130319/180102366/Moscow-
Needs-Explanations-on-US-Missile-Shield d-Changes.html (19.3.2013). 
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9. Abbreviations 
ACV Armored Combat Vehicles 
aCFE adapted CFE Treaty 
CFE Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) 
CFE-1A Concluding Act of the Negotiations on Personnel Strength of Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe (CFE 1A Agreement) 
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States 
CLRS Conventional Long-Range Strike 
CPGS Conventional Prompt Global Strike  
CPC Conflict Prevention Center 
CSBM Confidence and Security Building Measure 
CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (since January 1995 OSCE) 
CST Collective Security Treaty 
CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization 
EEC Exclusive Economic Zone 
EU European Union 
FSC Forum for Security Cooperation 
HLTF High Level Task Force 
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 
JCG Joint Consultative Group 
MOU Memorandum of Understanding 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NPR Nuclear Posture Review 
NRC NATO-Russia Council 
OOV Object of Verification 
OPCW Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
OSCE Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
POET Protocol on Existing Types of Conventional Armaments and Equipment 
START Strategic Arms Reduction Talks 
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
VD Vienna Document 
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Annex I: Main elements of the CFE Treaty 
The CFE Treaty was signed in Paris on 19 November 1990 with unlimited duration. All 
22 member states of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact (not the alliances themselves) 
became participants of the regime in two groups of state parties. The application area 
includes the entire territory of all member states from the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains. 
The regime limited the conventional land and air forces of its participants in five major 
weapon categories: battle tanks, armored combat vehicles (ACVs), artillery pieces with 
100 mm caliber and above, attack helicopters and combat aircraft. The CFE Treaty was 
accompanied by the politically binding CFE 1A Agreement that limits the personnel 
strength of the land and air forces. An annual information exchange every December 
provides the data for the verification regime and allows the inspection of treaty limited 
items in declared sites without the right of refusal or challenge inspections outside de-
clared sites with the right of refusal. Changes in the organizational structure of forces 
must be notified announced in advance. After the reduction phase, which ended in 1995, 
each group should hold no more than 20,000 tanks, 30,000 ACVs, 20,000 artillery pieces, 
2,000 combat helicopters and 6,800 combat aircraft.  
Its main goal was the prevention of a large-scale offensive and surprise attack between 
both groups based on the principle of parity on lower levels than heretofore. Both groups 
have accepted regional limits for the weapon categories of land forces. These constraints are 
the lowest in the central region51 of Europe (7,500 tanks, 11,250 ACVs, 5,000 artillery piec-
es) on both sides, higher in the middle region52 of Europe (10,300 tanks, 19,260 ACVs, 9,100 
artillery pieces) and highest in the extended region53 of Europe at the Atlantic or the Ural 
Mountains (15,300 tanks, 24,100 ACVs, 14,000 artillery pieces) in order fulfill the above-
mentioned goals. For reasons of stability, the flank region54 has been separately limited 
(4,700 tanks, 5,900 ACVs, 6,000 artillery pieces). The Joint Consultative Group shall per-
manently discuss and solve technical problems and ambiguities of the treaty and the review 
conference should survey the regime and its functions every five years.  
Owing to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Baltic States did not enter 
the treaty, whereas Russia and seven other successor states (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova and Ukraine) divided up their rights and obligation in the 
Tashkent Agreement of 15 May 1992. With all these adjustments, the treaty finally en-
tered into force on 9 November 1992. Russia and Ukraine were never satisfied with their 
 
 
51  This region consists on both sides of Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the Czech and 
Slovak Republics, Hungary and Poland.  
52  This region additionally includes, on both sides, Italy, France, the United Kingdom, Denmark and the 
former Soviet military districts Baltic, Byelorussia, Carpathian and Kiev with separate limits for the dis-
trict of Kiev. 
53  This region further includes, on both sides, Spain, Portugal and the former Soviet military districts Mos-
cow and Volga-Ural. 
54  This region consists, on both sides, of Iceland, Norway, Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, and the for-
mer Soviet military districts of Leningrad, Odessa, Transcaucasus and North Caucasus. 
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original flank limitations and negotiated a smaller territory for the same limits in 1997 
(CFE Flank Agreement 1997) with the Flank Agreement. 
Annex II: Main elements of the Vienna Document 2011 
The Vienna Document on Confidence and Security Building Measures was first approved 
in 1990 and further updated in 1992, 1994, 1999, and 2011. The latest update contains 
only small technical improvements (see last mechanism). A major adaptation to the pre-
sent security situation in Europe is still pending. Currently, the Vienna Document con-
tains 12 major mechanisms:  
The Annual Exchange of Military Information obliges all participants to publicize 
the command structure and the weapons of land and air forces based on single military 
units, including armored vehicles with antitank missile launchers and non-active units. 
The relocation of units and activation of non-active units beyond certain thresholds must 
be indicated in advance. It also covers the planned introduction and deployment of new 
major weapon systems and their figures.  
The annual exchange of information on Defense Planning provides data on size, 
structure, training and equipment of armed forces (including naval forces), as well as 
defence policy, doctrines and budgets in the medium and long term. A request for clarifi-
cation is possible and all participants are encouraged to provide voluntarily additional 
information.  
The mechanism for Risk Reduction allows every participant to ask for clarification, 
consultation and co-operation with regard to unusual military activities within 48 hours. 
Additionally, a voluntary visit is possible to dispel concerns about military activities. Fur-
thermore, a co-operative mechanism exists for the reporting and clarification of hazard-
ous incidents of a military nature.  
The number and quality of Military Contacts should be further strengthened among 
others by a visit of one air base within a five year period. New major weapon systems 
should be demonstrated to all other participants and programs for regular contacts (such 
as seminars, cultural and sports events) and military co-operation should be developed.  
A Prior Notification of Certain Military Activities is necessary 42 days in advance, if 
they involve at least 9,000 soldiers or 250 tanks, or 250 artillery pieces or 500 armored 
combat vehicles (ACVs). If 200 or more sorties of combat aircraft are to be flown during 
such an activity, this must be also indicated. Additionally, an amphibious landing, heli-
borne landing or parachute assault activity with at least 3,000 soldiers must be notified in 
advance.  
An Observation of Certain Military Activities is allowed if they involve at least 
13,000 soldiers, 300 tanks, 500 ACVs or 250 artillery pieces. Further, an observation is 
allowed for amphibious landing, heliborne landing or parachute assault activities with at 
least 3,500 soldiers.  
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The Annual Calendars of Military Activities lists all certain military activities subject 
to prior notification for the subsequent year. If there is no such activity, this must be an-
nounced as well.  
The Constraining Provisions for military activities subject to prior notification allow 
only one activity within three years that involves 40,000 soldiers, 900 tanks, 900 artillery 
pieces or 2,000 ACVs, if it is notified in the annual calendar. It allows only three of such 
military activities in one year that involve 25,000 soldiers, 400 tanks, 400 artillery pieces 
800 ACVs and it allows only six of such military activities within one year which involves 
13,000 soldiers, 300 tanks, 300 artillery pieces or 500 ACVs.  
The Rules for Compliance and Verification allow inspections and evaluation visits. 
No participant must accept more than three inspections for one year. Evaluation visits 
should be conducted to examine annual military information and the deployment of new 
weapon systems. Every participant must accept one evaluation visit for 60 units of its land 
and air forces.  
Regional Measures on the bilateral or regional levels should enhance accountability 
and confidence. This mechanism contains detailed criteria and a list of possible measures.  
The Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting should evaluate the current and fu-
ture implementation of the regime, discuss compliance issues and possible improvements.  
The Final Provisions regulate the update of the VD in the FSC, the implementation of 
and information with the CPC, the use of the OSCE communication network and the 
information of the public and the partner states outside the OSCE. The final provisions 
contain the newest technical improvement of the VD. Every update of the VD will enter 
into force immediately with the consent of all participants.  
